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Abstract
Bank failures are generally liquidity as well as solvency events. Whether it is households
running on banks or banks running on banks, defunding episodes are full of drama. This
theater has, arguably, lured economists into placing liquidity at the epicenter of financial
collapse. But loss of liquidity describes how banks fail. Bad news about banks explains why
they fail. This paper models banking crises as triggered by news that the degree (share) of
banking malfeasance is likely to be particularly high. The malfeasance share follows a state-
dependent Markov process. When this period’s share is high, agents rationally raise their
probability that next period’s share will be high as well. Whether or not this proves true,
agents invest less in banks, reducing intermediation and output. Deposit insurance prevents
such defunding and stabilizes the economy. But it sustains bad banking, lowering welfare.
Private monitoring helps, but is no panacea. It partially limits banking malfeasance. But
it does so ine ciently as households needlessly replicate each others’ costly information
acquisition. Moreover, if private audits become public, private monitoring breaks down
due to free-riding. Government real-time disclosure of banking malfeasant mitigates, if not
eliminates, this public goods problem leading to potentially large gains in both non-stolen
output and welfare.
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1. Introduction1
Banks (our name for financial institutions, broadly defined) have traditionally been modeled2
as honest entities satisfying liquidity needs via issuance of demand deposits and other short-3
term liabilities (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)). Banking crises have been viewed as runs4
motivated by the fear that others will appropriate one’s money (Diamond and Dybvig5
(1983) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)). But deposit insurance has largely eliminated6
concern about transaction balances. Indeed, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 saw essentially7
no traditional commercial bank runs (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011)) by non-8
institutional investors.1 Instead, as Covitz et al. (2013) and others document, banks stopped9
funding one another based on perceptions, some true, some false, that financial institutions10
had gone bad. The serial collapse of large, highly opaque banks raised concern about the11
defunding of surviving, but equally opaque, banks. Attempts to pay creditors led to fire sales12
of “troubled” assets. This fed the defunding panic, producing more implicit and explicit13
failures. Overnight, bank secret-keeping, which left potential refunders in the dark about14
each-other’s true solvency, went from a sign of collective trust to one of financial distress, if15
not financial fraud.16
Bankruptcies, financial or not, are typically liquidity as well as solvency events.2 The17
29 global financial institutions that failed, either explicitly or implicitly, during the Great18
Recession, all lost or were about to lose external funding in the run up to their demises. The19
drama of financial firms running short of cash – J.P. Morgan’s dramatic 2007 rescue of Wall20
Street, the serial collapse of 9,000 commercial-banks in the Great Depression, California’s21
shocking seizure of Executive Life, the panicked resolution of Long Term Capital Manage-22
ment, the Fed’s emergency weekend meetings that “saved” Bear Sterns and let Lehman23
Brothers collapse, the remarkable nationalizations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG,24
the last minute passage of the Trouble Asset Relief Program, the urgent IMF-ECB bailout25
of Cypriot banks, etc. – naturally focuses attention on banks’ death throes. Yet, how26
banks fail does not tell us why banks fail. Short of pure coordination failure (switching27
1The Northern Rock run was quickly ended by the extension of deposit insurance by the Bank of England.
Similarly, the U.S. Treasury stopped the run on money market funds by backing their bucks.
2Illiquidity can, if su ciently severe, trigger insolvency.
2
spontaneously to a bad equilibrium), bank failures are triggered by bad news. Historically,28
this has been bad news about bad banking, where “bad” includes fraudulent, irresponsible,29
negligent, and incompetent behavior.30
Actual or suspected malfeasance has instigated many, perhaps most financial crises. In31
1720, insider trading and fraudulent misrepresentation led to collapses of both the South Sea32
and Mississippi bubbles. The attempted cornering of the U.S. bond market kindled the Panic33
of 1792. The sale of investments in the imaginary Latin American country of Poyais led to34
the Panic of 1825. “Wildcat banking” helped produce the Panic of 1837. The embezzlement35
of assets from the Ohio Life and Trust Co. instigated the Railroad Crisis of 1857 (Gibbons36
(1907)). Jay Gould and James Fisk’s cornering of the gold market precipitated the 186937
Gold Panic. Cooke and Company’s failure to disclose losses on Northern Pacific Railroad38
stock sparked the Panic of 1873. A failed cornering of United Cooper’s stocks instigated the39
Panic of 1907. The Hatry Group’s use of fraudulent collateral to buy United Steel, the sale40
of Florida swamp land, the Match King Hoax, the Samuel Insull fraud and the disclosure41
of other swindles ushered in the Great Depression.3 Insider trading and stock manipulation42
brought down Drexel Burnham Lambert, precipitating the largest insurance failure in U.S.43
history. And revelation of liar loans, no-doc loans, and NINJA loans laid the groundwork44
for the demise of major U.S. and foreign financial firms and the Great Recession.445
This paper focuses on why banks fail. The reason considered is malfeasance. We treat46
intermediation, not liquidity provision via maturity transformation, as the raison d’être47
for banks, and the loss of intermediation services, not the loss of liquidity or maturity48
transformation, as the economic essence of a financial crisis. Our demurral on liquidity49
and maturity transformation seems justified by theory and fact. As shown by Jacklin50
(1983, 1986, 1989) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), bank’s heralded role as maturity51
transformers can be either fully or largely replicated by financial markets alone.5 But unlike52
banks, when financial markets transform maturity, they do so without risk of financial panic,53
3See Pecora Commission (1934).
4See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011).
5We include mutual funds, which Jacklin calls “equity deposits”, as a financial-market instrument.
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which destroys the very liquidity banks are said to provide.6 There is also scant evidence54
that banks are e↵ective in transforming maturities.55
Our framework is simple – a two-period OLG model with two sectors – farming and56
banking. Both sectors produce an identical good, corn. Farming is small scale and done by57
sole proprietors. The banking sector gathers resources from multiple investors and engages58
in large-scale and more e cient farming. Production in farming is certain. Production in59
banking is uncertain due to banker malfeasance. Specifically, each period every bank has60
an identical but random share of dishonest, negligent or incompetent bankers, labeled bad61
bankers, in their employ. These bankers steal or lose all output arising from investments62
placed with them.7 Consequently, if 20 percent of bankers are bad, the banking industry63
will produce 20 percent less output. An equivalent interpretation of our model is that a64
share of banks is fully malfeasant. I.e. these bank steal or lose all output from investments65
and arise in the same proportion as our posited share of bad bankers. In what follows, we66
reference “the share of bad bankers.” But one can substitute these words, “the share of67
bank output lost due to bad banks.”68
The share of bad bankers obeys a state-dependent Markov process. On average, the share69
is low enough and banking is productive enough for banking to generate a higher expected70
return than farming and, thereby, attract considerable investment. But when a larger than71
expected number of bad bankers surfaces, the projected future share of bad bankers rises.72
This causes investors to shift out of banking, potentially abruptly, until su cient time has73
passed to lower the expected share of malfeasant bankers. This process produces not just74
periodic and, potentially, extended banking crises, but also a highly ine cient economy.75
Introducing deposit insurance eliminates one problem and introduces another. It ends76
banking crises but at the price of keeping bad bankers (equivalently, bad banks) in business.77
This moral hazard is raised in multiple studies including Gertler et al. (2012); Demirgüç-78
Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1999, 2002); Calomiris and Haber (2014) and Calomiris et al.79
6Ironically, banks are heralded for providing liquidity, yet have, historically, precipitated its loss precisely
at times when it is of most value.
7There are lots of legal ways to “steal,” including charging hidden fees, churning portfolios to generate
higher fees, cream-skimming the purchase of assets, buying assets at above-market price from reciprocating
bankers, and taking on excessive risk.
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(2016). The result is higher total output, but more stolen output. Since the government80
levies taxes to fund its insurance of purloined or lost output, the insurance does nothing to81
reduce bad-banker risk. Nor does it insure anything real. It simply induces households to82
invest with banks regardless of the risk. Like a compensated tax, deposit insurance distorts83
behavior, producing an excess burden.884
Monitoring banking practices is another option. But information, once released, becomes85
a public good. Since households have no incentive to keep the results of their monitoring86
private, they will likely share what they know. In this case, each household will free-ride87
on the monitoring of others. This reduces, if not eliminates, monitoring. The first-best88
policy – disclosure – addresses the opacity problem directly by shutting down malfeasant89
bankers’ modus vivendi, namely operating in the dark. Turning on the lights requires90
government provision of the missing public good, namely pubic revelation, either in full91
or in part (depending on cost), of the malfeasance. This weeds out bad banking, raising92
non-stolen output and welfare. The practical counterpart of this policy prescription is real-93
time, government disclosure and verification of all bank assets and liabilities to ensure that94
the net capital invested in banks is actually being used to produce output that’s paid to95
investors and workers.996
2. Literature Review97
The seminal Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) articles modeled bank deposits98
as insurance against unexpected liquidity needs and bank runs as a switch from a good to a99
bad equilibrium. These papers sparked a major literature connecting banking to liquidity.100
Examples include Jacklin (1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Holmström and Tirole101
(1998), Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), He and Xiong (2012) and102
Acharya et al. (2011).103
Liquidity is a key element of the financial system. But is it really at the heart of banking?104
8In our model, bad bankers extract resources from the economy, which cannot be reclaimed by the
government. Their theft represents aggregate risk against which the government cannot insure. Hence,
insurance payments made to households are exactly o↵set by taxes to cover those payments.
9As noted by Kotliko↵ (2010), this work can be performed by private firms working exclusively for the
government.
5
And is maturity transformation as important as its prevalence in the literature suggests?105
The Bryant and Diamond-Dybvig liquidity-insurance/maturity-transformation models pre-106
dict investment-like returns on demand and other short-term deposits. Yet real returns on107
transaction accounts have historically been very small, if not negative. Moreover, mod-108
ern economies are replete with health, accident, auto, homeowners, malpractice, longevity,109
property and casualty, disability, long-term care insurance, credit cards, and equity lines of110
credit – all of which provide liquidity in times of personal economic crisis. Then there are111
financial markets, whose securities can be sold as needed to provide liquidity and transform112
maturities. Indeed, Jacklin (1989) argues that equity markets can provide as much liquidity113
insurance as bank deposits and transform maturities just as well. Moreover, they can do so114
with no danger of bank runs or any other type of financial crisis.10115
Still, liquidity risk continues to stimulate research. Dang et al. (2017) add a new wrinkle116
to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), namely the staggered arrival of participants to the liquidity117
insurance market. They show that banking opacity permits late arrivals to participate in the118
market since opacity leaves them with no more information than early arrivals. The work119
by Dang et al. (2017) echoes Hirshleifer (1971), who points out that disclosure is detrimen-120
tal to those holding claims on overvalued assets. Other researchers, including Holmström121
and Tirole (1998), Andolfatto (2010), Gorton (2009) and Gorton and Ordonez (2014) warn122
that public audits, while providing a public good, namely public information, comes at the123
price of market crashes. Whether policymakers are deliberately limiting audits to protect124
malfeasant banks is an open question. Either way, today’s limited, quasi-voluntary disclo-125
sure is of limited value. As Johnson and Kwak (2010) state, “Lehman Brothers ... was126
more than adequately capitalized on paper, with Tier 1 capital of 11.6 percent, shortly127
before it went bankrupt in September 2008. Thanks to the literally voluminous report by128
the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, we now know this was in part due to aggressive and129
misleading accounting.”130
10Jacklin’s proviso is that information between investors and banks not be asymmetric in the context of
aggregate risk. We suggest that the asymmetry of information can be eliminated, either fully or largely in
the presence or absence of aggregate risk, by real-time government-orchestrated or supervised verification
and disclosure of bank assets and liabilities.
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Like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Diamond (1984); Brealey et al. (1977), we treat the131
problems incumbent in providing intermediation as arising from asymmetric information –132
bad bankers know they are bad, household investors do not. However, those studies stress133
di↵erential knowledge between bankers and borrowers whereas our focus is on di↵erential134
knowledge between bankers and savers (equivalently, investors). In the former studies, the135
unobservable was the trustworthiness of borrowers. In our study, the unobservable is the136
trustworthiness of bankers.137
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) also model financial malfea-138
sance. However, bankers do not steal or otherwise misappropriate output in equilibrium.139
Borrowing thresholds and the exposure of equity holders to losses keep such behavior from140
happening. In our model, bad bankers expropriate or lose output in equilibrium unless they141
are disclosed ex-ante. Disclosure is a natural remedy in our model, but faces real-world142
objection from a surprising source, namely regulators. Regulators worry that too much143
disclosure in the midst of a financial meltdown can fuel asset fire sales.11 But this concern144
is about ex-post disclosure. Our focus is on ex-ante disclosure, i.e., preventing malfeasance145
in advance via, in part, initial and ongoing, real-time asset verification.146
Our paper extends Chamley et al. (2012), which sets aside the liquidity-insurance/maturity-147
transformation rationale for banking. Instead it justifies banks based on their principal148
economic role – financial intermediation. And it models bank runs as arising from actual149
or perceived malfeasance in the provision of intermediation services. The Chamley et al.150
(2012) model has a quite di↵erent structure and is static. Ours is dynamic. We consider how151
current malfeasance undermines future financial intermediation, productivity and welfare152
since current malfeasance generates lingering doubts about the trustworthiness of bankers.153
The banking “runs” considered here are simply decisions to invest less, at least in the short154
run, in banks. The associated contraction of the banking sector can be labeled a liquidity155
crisis. But the crisis is triggered by news of a larger than expected share of bad bankers,156
not the sudden need for money by of a large segment of the public.157
Banks have generally been modeled as honest institutions, which, in their e↵orts to pro-158
11See www.sec.gov/spotlight/fairvalue/marktomarket/mtmtranscript102908.pdf.
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vide a full, if risky, return to investors, are occasionally stymied by panicked or misinformed159
creditors. Moreover, bad news about banks is about poor investment returns, not the theft,160
scams, swindles, Ponzi schemes, excess fees, etc., recorded in, for example, the Security and161
Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement’s annual reports. The SEC’s enforcement162
actions now total over two per week.12 Of course, the SEC only reports frauds the agency163
detects.13 It is impossible to say how much financial fraud goes undetected. Moreover,164
there are other federal and state government agencies and branches, such as Massachusetts’165
Financial Investigations Division, which investigate and prosecute financial crime, but do166
not provide annual listings of their enforcement actions. And explicit fraud, such as the167
Mado↵ or the Stanford Ponzi schemes, is not the only type of fraud at play. Much financial168
fraud takes subtle forms that is rarely viewed, even by economists, as such. An example is a169
bank that legally operates based on proprietary information to the detriment of the public.170
Townsend (1979) models this behavior, albeit without the pejorative connotation. He posits171
informed agents that force uninformed agents to enter a debt contract to limit the extent172
to which they must pay to investigate cheating. He applies this to borrowers’ incentives to173
renege on loans but it could equally be applied to banks’ incentives to cheat investors.174
The obvious policy solution is exposing malfeasant bankers and banking. Such disclosure,175
as proposed by Kotliko↵ (2010) and to a lesser extent by Pagano and Volpin (2012) and176
Hanson and Sunderam (2013), would go far beyond current practices. It would largely entail177
real-time verification of bank assets. Take, for example, mortgage verification. Verifying178
a mortgage application requires determining the employment status, earnings, outstanding179
debts, and credit record of the mortgagee and appraising the value of the house being180
purchased. Now, as before the Great Recession, U.S. mortgage verification is in the hands181
of private lenders, such as the former Country Wide Financial, a company heavily fined for182
originating and selling fraudulent mortgages.14 But such verification could readily be done183
by the government or private companies working solely for the government. Indeed, thanks184
12https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf
13A separate metric for financial fraud is provided by www.ponzitracker.com, which suggests the dis-
covery of one new Ponzi scheme per week in recent years.
14See https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm
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to its tax records, the government can better verify income on mortgage applications than185
the private sector. Had such government mortgage verification been in place prior to 2007,186
there would, arguably, have been few, if any, liar, no-doc, and NINJA loans – all of which187
appear to have produced a major rise in the perceived and actual share of bad banks.188
3. The Model189
Agents in our OLG framework work full-time when young and are retired when old. They190
consume in both periods. Agents born at time t maximize their expected utility, EUt, given191
by192
EUt =   log cy,t + (1   )Et log co,t+1, (1)
over cy,t, co,t+1 and ↵s,t, subject to193
co,t+1 = At+1[(1  ↵s,t)(1 + rf,t+1) + ↵s,t(1 + r̃b,t+1)], (2)
and194
cy,t + At+1 = wt. (3)
The terms cy,t and co,t+1 reference consumption when young and old at t and t+1, wt is the195
time-t wage, At+1 equals the time-t saving of generation t, and rf,t+1 and r̃b,t+1 are the safe196
and risky returns to farming and banking. The share of generation t0s assets invested in197
banking is ↵s,t. The s subscript references the state of mean malfeasance this period, which198
a↵ects the allocation decision. Capital does not depreciate. Optimization entails199
Cy,t =  wt, (4)
200




1 + (1  ↵s,t)rf,t+1 + ↵tr̃b,t+1
= 0. (6)
9
Investment in the two sectors satisfies202
Kf,t+1 = (1  ↵s,t)At+1, (7)
203
Kb,t+1 = ↵s,tAt+1. (8)
Output is Cobb-Douglas with labor’s share equaling 1   ✓ in each industry. Farm output204








A proportion, mt, of banking output is stolen or lost each period. Henceforth, we reference206
such lost output simply as “stolen.” Non-stolen banking output is, thus207
Bt = (1 mt)ZbK✓b,tL1 ✓b,t , (10)




= Ft + Bt. (11)
Total output is209




















Agents invest in banking because the sector is more productive, i.e., Zb > Zf . But, absent212
deposit insurance, they diversify due to the risk that banking malfeasance is greater than213
expected. Malfeasance, mt, is the sum of two components – its time-t mean, m̄t, plus an214
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i.i.d. shock, ✏t, i.e.,215
mt = m̄t + ✏t. (15)
Mean malfeasance is either high, m̄H , or low, m̄L, and obeys a Markov process.216





m̄H with probability qH
m̄L with probability 1  qH .
(16)





m̄H with probability qL
m̄L with probability 1  qL,
(17)
where qH > qL. The additional shock, ✏t+1, is uniformly distributed with the same support,219
a and b, regardless of the state, i.e.,220
✏t+1 ⇠ U(a, b). (18)
When monitoring is feasible, households can pay to learn about this second shock, ✏t+1.
Households observe the malfeasance share at t and infer the current state of the world,
st 2 {L,H}, and the transition probability, qs,t 2 {qL, qH}. Their optimal allocation choice,
↵s,t, will change given this information. A high state of malfeasance this period will likely
persist leading households to invest less in banking. Given eqs. (1) to (8) and (13) to (18),







b,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1)  rHf,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1)








b,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1)  rLf,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1)
1 + ↵s,tr̃Lb,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1) + (1  ↵s,t)rLf,t+1(↵s,t, ✏t+1)
d✏t+1,
where superscripts reference expected returns if the high and low malfeasance states arise221
at time t+1.15 These returns depend on the malfeasance share (both its mean at t+1 and222
15The first (second) term of eq. (19) captures the marginal e↵ect on utility of increasing the allocation to
banking provided the mean malfeasance share at t+1 is high (low). Both terms integrate over the possible
realizations of ✏t+1. The optimal choice of ↵s,t, must be solved numerically. To rule out short-sales, we
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✏t+1) as well as the allocation of capital to banking, ↵s,t. Reduced forms for these returns223
are derived in Appendix A.224
Capital’s allocation between the two sectors is determined at the beginning of each225
period based on agents’ portfolio choice. The allocation of labor, in contrast, is determined226
at the end of each period such that workers earn the same wage net of malfeasance in both227
sectors. This condition, our normalization of total labor supply at 1 and the allocation of228
labor between the two sectors are specified by229
Lb,t + Lf,t = 1, (20)
230





























where ↵t 1 references the portfolio share chosen at time t  1.233
4. Calibration234
Table 1 reports our calibration. The time-preference factor,  , is set to 0.5 and capital’s
share, ✓, is set to 0.3. Our assumed mean malfeasance shares are m̄H = .50 and m̄L = .22.
The two assumed TFP levels are Zf = 10 and Zb = 16. In combination, these parameters
satisfy
(1  m̄H)Zb < Zf < (1  m̄L)Zb.
calibrate the model such that ↵s,t 2 (0, 1).
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This restriction ensures interior solutions to the share of assets invested in banks. We allow235
the shock, ✏t+1, to raise or lower the malfeasance share by .1, i.e., {a, b} = { 0.1, 0.1}.236
Finally, we set the probabilities of a high mean malfeasance share at t + 1 to be 0.6 when237
the mean malfeasance share is high at time t and 0.4 when the mean malfeasance share is238
low at time t. I.e., qH = .6 and qL = .4.239
5. Base Model Results240
The model’s average values in its stochastic steady state are reported in table 2. Table 3 and241
table 4 report averages for low and high mean malfeasance states, respectively. The values242
in these tables are based on a 10,020-period transition. We simulated our model for 10, 020243
periods, but consider only data after the first 20 periods in tables 2 to 4. This removes the244
e↵ect of initial conditions. Assets at t = 0 in this simulation were set at the mean level of245
assets arising in periods 21 through 10,020. m̄0 = m̄L. We iterated to ensure that mean246
assets used for A0 equal mean assets over the 10,000 periods since the path of assets depends247
on A0. In simulating alternative banking policies as well as private monitoring over 10,020248
periods, we use the same period-by-period draws of mean malfeasance and ✏t.249
Given our calibration, banking malfeasance has a major economic cost. Across all states,250
21.8 percent of output is stolen. In low mean malfeasance states, 17.2 percent is stolen. In251
high mean malfeasance states, 27.2 percent is stolen. Moreover, average non-stolen output252
when mean malfeasance is high is 24.7 percent lower than when mean malfeasance is low.253
Since wages are proportional to output and consumption when young is proportion to wages,254
both variables are also, on average, 24.7 percent lower in high compared to low states.255
Consumption when old is only 15.5 percent lower across the two types of states. The reason256
is that consumption when old includes not just the income on assets, but the principal as257
well. And the principal is not impacted by banker malfeasance.258
Agents respond to bad times in banking by moving their assets into farming. When259
malfeasance is high, only 28 percent of assets are allocated to banking. When low, the260
figure is 86 percent. We refer here to the value of ↵, which determines capital’s allocation261
in the subsequent period. The share of capital in the high state is larger – 54.9 percent,262
while the share in the low state is smaller – 67.3 percent than suggested by these values263
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for ↵. This reflects the fact that the high (low) state emerges, in part, from states that are264
low (high) in the prior period. But when agents see higher prospects for bad (good) times,265
they take cover (leave their shelter) by setting their values of ↵ appropriately. The fact that266
agents cannot tell for sure what is coming when it comes to the state of mean malfeasance267
means that capital is perpetually mis-allocated. This is another economic cost arising from268
bad bankers in addition to their direct theft of output and their general negative influence269
on investment in banking. The misallocation of capital is partially o↵set by the reallocation270
of labor. On average, banking accounts for 56 percent of total employment. In periods of271
high mean malfeasance, this figure is 38 percent. It is 74 percent when there is low mean272
malfeasance.273
The average annualized return to investing in banking is 2.04 percent compared with274
2.01 percent in farming.16 Although their mean returns are similar, as the table’s standard275
deviation of returns shows, investing in banking is far riskier than investing in farming. This276
explains why farming always attracts a goodly share of investment.277
Figure 1 plots returns in the two sectors for di↵erent values of ✏t+1 and realizations of278
the time-t+1 malfeasance state assuming At equals its average value. The dotted red line279
shows returns, for di↵erent values of ✏t+1, if the malfeasance state at t+1 is high. The solid280
black line shows returns, for di↵erent values of ✏t+1, if the malfeasance state at t+ 1 is low.281
The top panels shows annualized returns if the malfeasance state is high at time t. The282
bottom panels shows returns if the malfeasance state is low at time t.283
The right-hand side panels show that higher malfeasance, whether caused by a) moving284
to or staying in a high malfeasance state at t + 1 or b) a high draw on ✏t+1, implies lower285
returns to banking at t + 1; i.e., the dotted red curves lie below the solid black curves and286
both slope downward.287
The left-hand side panels show the opposite in the case of the returns to farming. This288
reflects a greater allocation of labor to farming the greater the share of malfeasance in289
banking. More labor in farming means a higher marginal product of capital and, thus, a290
higher return. This e↵ect of labor moving into farming is stronger the smaller the degree of291
16In forming annualized returns, we assume each period corresponds to 30 years.
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malfeasance at time t — the case when relatively little capital will be invested in farming292
in t + 1. This explains the larger gap between the red and black curves in the bottom left293
panel than in the top left panel. Figure 2 plots the distribution of realized returns in period294
t + 1 simulated in the 10,000-periods referenced above. This figure, while organized like295
Figure 1, incorporates changes in At from from period to period. The panels on the right296
consider bank returns. Those on the left consider farm returns. The top (bottom) panels297
consider returns at t + 1 when the malfeasance state is high (low) in period t. Finally, the298
red (black) histogram references high (low) malfeasant states arising at time t + 1. The299
vertical bar shows mean returns in each time t+ 1 state.300
As expected, bank (farm) returns are lower (higher) at t+ 1 when the t+ 1 malfeasant301
state is high (low). The position of the histograms reflects di↵erent allocations, at time302
t, in capital between the two sectors. The variance in the histograms reflects the impact303
of movements of labor across sectors on the return to capital in the two sectors. The304
impact on a sector’s return from employing more labor is greater the smaller the initial305
allocation of capital to that sector. Figure 3 shows histograms of non-stolen output, assets,306
annualized farm and banking returns. The histograms’ results are unconditional, i.e., they307
include both high and low malfeasance states in the prior period which explains why they308
are multi-modal. They are also quite dispersed suggesting that banking malfeasance can309
produce peaks and troughs in non-stolen output, wages, and assets that are very far apart.310
As expected, a switch in the mean malfeasance state from one period to the next produces311
much greater changes in macro conditions than no switch. Figure 4 records the transition312
beginning with high average malfeasance, switching to low average malfeasance in period 3,313
and then switching back to and remaining at high average malfeasance in periods 4 through314
10. Figure 5 illustrates the opposite – i.e., a temporary switch from low to high and then back315
to low average malfeasance. The path of the additional shock to the malfeasance share, ✏t, is316
kept at 0 in both transitions. Consider fig. 4. In period 3, when mean banking malfeasance317
declines, more labor is allocated to banking and there is an increase in non-stolen output.318
But since the shock hits after capital has been allocated, there is no immediate impact319
on the capital stock. There is a major impact in period 4 reflecting agents’ decisions to320
invest more in banking given its higher expected return. Given that high mean malfeasance321
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reoccurs in period 4, this investment decision is an ex-post mistake. But once the capital322
is allocated, it cannot be reallocated. The ex-post excessive investment in banking draws323
additional labor into banking. Hence, there is a mis-allocation, again, on an ex-post basis,324
of labor as well as capital.325
Notwithstanding the additional capital and labor allocated to banking, non-stolen output326
is smaller in period 4 than in, for example, period 2. The fact that the economy is so327
di↵erent in period 4 from, for example, period 2 indicates the importance of beliefs about328
mean malfeasance – whether those beliefs are correct or, as in this case, incorrect. Indeed,329
as a comparison of the change in Yt between periods 2 and 3, on the one hand, and period330
3 and 4, on the other, shows, the change in beliefs about the malfeasance shock produces331
larger output fluctuations than does the shock itself. Another interesting point about the332
two impulse-response transitions is that one is not the obverse of the other. Consider, for333
example, the impact on wages. In fig. 4, wages rise above their initial value and then fall334
below it following the temporary reduction in mean malfeasance. In contrast, in fig. 5335
wages fall and gradually return to their period-2 value following a temporary rise in mean336
malfeasance.337
Figure 6 records a third controlled experiment, this one with a prolonged improvement338
in mean malfeasance. Like the prior two, ✏t is set to zero. The economy starts with high339
mean malfeasance, followed by low mean malfeasance for 6 periods, followed by high mean340
malfeasance for 2 periods. As a comparison with fig. 5 shows, the economy’s path is highly341
sensitive to the exact sequence of mean malfeasance shocks. This sensitivity, as we’ve342
seen, reflects immediate impacts, but, more importantly, the formation of beliefs about the343
economy’s future.344
Adding ✏t shocks to the mean malfeasance share, we arrive at our baseline transition,345
fig. 7. The path of these added shocks for the first 10 periods is reported in table 5. We346
use the same path of shocks to mean malfeasance and ✏t in our comparisons below of the347
baseline economy with the baseline economy augmented to include alternative government348






Deposit insurance insulates savers from losses due to bad bankers, leading to exclusive354
investment in banking. If the mean share turns out to be low, the insurance succeeds in355
generating more non-stolen output than would otherwise arise if savers shied away from356
banks.17 But if the mean malfeasance share turns out to be high, savers are actually worse357
o↵ than without deposit insurance. Yes, they are compensated for their loses, but they358
have to pay taxes to cover the compensation. In short, since the share of malfeasance is359
an aggregate risk, deposit insurance provides no real insurance in the aggregate. Instead,360
it simply induces savers to invest exclusively in banking even in times when its highly361
risky from a macro prospective. Getting savers to over invest in banking when they should362
engenders, of course, an excess burden.363




















This is financed by a lump-sum tax, ⌧DI,t, levied on the elderly to prevent redistribution365
across generations.366












With deposit insurance, we have,368
{Kf,t+1, Lf,t+1, Kb,t+1, Lb,t+1} = {0, 0, At+1, 1} (27)
Figure 8 shows the path of the economy with deposit insurance using the same path of369
17This may explain why deposit insurance is often introduced during crises. Another explanation is that
voters do not internalize the need to pay taxes to cover insurance claims.
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shocks as the baseline transition in fig. 6. Although total output is higher, non-stolen370
output and consumption is lower in bad states. Table 6 compares deposit insurance to371
the baseline. All assets are, as indicated, now allocated to banking in all periods. When372
the share of bad bankers is low, non-stolen output, wages and consumption are higher.373
But when the share is high, wages, consumption and saving are lower than would be true374
absent deposit insurance.18 Thus, increased allocation to banking due to deposit insurance375
increases the volatility of consumption and non-stolen assets. This accords with findings of376
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1999, 2002).377
We next calculate the factor,  , needed to compensate both the old and the young, in all
states, to make their expected utility in the baseline, denoted EUs,t, equal to their expected














=EUs,t + log  .
Hence   = exp(EU 0
s,t
  EUs,t). Expected lifetime utility in the model’s stochastic steady378
state is measured by average realized lifetime utility over 10,000 successive generations born379
after the 20th period of the transition. For deposit insurance, the value of   is 1.041 implying380
households must be compensated with 4.1 percent more consumption in all states to make381
them as well o↵ as under the baseline case. Stated di↵erently, the excess burden of deposit382
insurance is a sizable 4.1 percent of consumption.383
7. Monitoring Banks384
7.1. Private Monitoring385
As the behavior of rating companies leading up to the 2008 crisis showed, bank-funded386
monitoring su↵ers from the “ratings shopping” examined in Skreta and Veldkamp (2009);387
18With all output being produced in the banking sector, more output is lost when the share of bad bankers
is high.
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Sangiorgi et al. (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012). Even if we assume ratings are unbiased,388
they may be too imprecise to help (Goel and Thakor (2015); Doherty et al. (2009)).19389
As an alternative, we consider monitoring financed by investors, that is, by households.390
Specifically, we assume young agents can purchase a report that indicates, with probability391
p, the realization of ✏t+1.20 With probability (1  p) no information is gained. In this case,392
agents make uninformed investment choices.393
Let nt be the percentage of wage income spent on reports. We assume additional expen-394
diture increases the likelihood of receiving information, p, with decreasing marginal e↵ect,21395





Households purchase the welfare-maximizing quantity of information, nt. Returns to capital397
depend on the aggregate allocation to banking, designated by a bar, which depends on the398
mix of the two types of agents, informed and uninformed, per399
↵̄s,t(✏t+1) = p↵I,s,t(✏t+1) + (1  p)↵U,s,t, (30)
where ↵I,s,t(✏t+1) is the asset allocation of informed agents and ↵U,s,t is the asset allocation
of uninformed agents. With probability p(nt), individuals receive information about ✏t+1
19In our model, this is analogous to assuming households cannot determine the accuracy (or honesty) of
a rating paid for by banks.
20Thus, informed agents know the malfeasance share at t+ 1 will be either m̄H + ✏t+1 or m̄L + ✏t+1.
21This can be micro-founded by assuming that nt buys many reports with each providing a noisy estimate
of the true realization of the shock, ✏t+1. With likelihood, p(x̄|✏t+1), where x̄ is the mean estimate given
n reports, the precision of the estimate will be increasing in n, parameterized by the variance of the data-
generating process for the reports.
22The coe cient, 100, is chosen so that households can spend one percent of income on monitoring and
receive information fifty percent of the time. This is su cient to induce households to monitor.
19




b,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)  rHf,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)





b,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)  rLf,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)
1 + ↵s,tr̃Lb,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1) + (1  ↵s,t)rLf,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)
,
where subscript s 2 {L,H} indicates the state at t.23400
With probability [1   p(nt)], individuals purchase reports, but receive no information.
Their optimal allocation choice, ↵U,s,t, solves a similar first-order condition to the no-
monitoring case (eq. (19)) by integrating over the support of ✏t+1 and the possibility of
the two states of the world next period, high and low. All returns are evaluated using







f,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)  r̃Hb,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)








f,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)  r̃Lb,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)
1 + (1  ↵U,s,t)rLf,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1) + ↵U,s,tr̃Lb,t+1(↵̄s,t, ✏t+1)
d✏t+1.
To recapitulate, with monitoring, households learn with probability p(nt) the realization of
✏t+1 and choose the optimal allocation, ↵I,s,t(✏t+1), which solves eq. (31). With probability
[1 p(nt)], households receive no information and and make an uninformed allocation, ↵U,s,t,
which is the implicit solution to eq. (32). Both solutions must be solved simultaneously.
The solution is detailed in Appendix B. Optimal expenditure on monitoring, nt, is chosen
to maximize expected utility








I,t+1(✏t+1) + (1  qs,t) logRLI,t+1(✏t+1)
 1
b  ad✏t+1







U,t+1(✏t+1) + (1  qs,t) logRLU,t+1(✏t+1)
 1
b  ad✏t+1,
23In (eq. (31)), we reference ↵̄s,t rather than ↵̄s,t(✏t+1) to limit notation.
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where the gross portfolio return if informed, given state S and ✏t+1, is401
R
S
I,t+1(✏t+1) = 1 + [1  ↵I,s,t(✏t+1)] rSf,t+1(↵̄s,t(✏t+1), ✏t+1) + ↵I,s,t(✏t+1)rSb,t+1(↵̄s,t(✏t+1), ✏t+1),
(34)
and the gross portfolio return if uninformed, given state S and ✏t+1, is402
R
S
U,t+1(✏t+1) = 1 + [1  ↵U,s,t] rSf,t+1(↵̄s,t(✏t+1), ✏t+1) + ↵U,s,trSb,t+1(↵̄s,t(✏t+1), ✏t+1). (35)
In eq. (33), the first two terms account for the sure cost to consumption when young and403
old. The third and fourth terms represent the net gains from monitoring.404
Under our calibration, if mean malfeasance is low at time t, households spend 1.13405
percent of their income on learning ✏t+1. This corresponds to a 53.1 percent chance of406
learning the true potential bad-bank share. If mean malfeasance is high at time t, households407
do not find it optimal to monitor. This is because the state of mean malfeasance a↵ects408
returns more than the realization of ✏t+1 so learning is of less value when malfeasance is409
likely to be high at t+ 1.410
When monitoring is optimal at time t (i.e., when the time-t mean malfeasance state411
is low), table 7 shows that information on an impending negative shock to ✏t+1 reduces412
investment in banking, on average, to 45 percent of savings. News of a positive shock413
triggers a corner solution and individuals invest all their assets in banking, as opposed to414
an average of 86 percent in the no-monitoring case. The e↵ect of informed individuals on415
the aggregate allocation also makes this corner solution optimal even for agents for whom416
monitoring generates no information. Figure 9 and table 8 show that monitoring makes417
relatively little di↵erence to the economy. Consumption when young and old does tend to418
be higher with monitoring. But the equilibrium is ine cient as agents replicate their e↵orts419
to learn the value of ✏t+1. Moreover, the downside to early information is more economic420
volatility. Still, calculated as a compensating variation using eq. (28), households are 1.2 per421
cent better o↵ in terms of lifetime expected utility than in the baseline if they can monitor.422
Relative to deposit insurance, however, monitoring improves welfare by 5.4 per cent. This423
is a substantial di↵erential. Unfortunately, monitoring can su↵er from free-riding.424
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7.2. Information as a Public Good425
Previously, report results were assumed to be private. We now allow some households who426
did not receive information to learn the value of ✏t+1 at zero cost with probability l. The427
decision to purchase reports takes into account the probability of receiving information for428
free. The probability of receiving information is now d429
d(nt) = l + (1  l)p(nt) (36)
Households take l as given. The marginal increase in the probability of learning the430




= p0(nt)(1  l). (37)
Clearly, as the fraction of leaked reports, l, increases, the marginal benefit of purchasing433
reports decreases. This leads to fewer reports in equilibrium. Figure 10 illustrates how the434
prospect of learning the true value for free reduces private monitoring. If households expect435
the probability of a leak to be above 0.8, only .02 percent of wages is spent on monitoring,436
yielding a probability of learning of just .02. Su ciently high free-riding eliminates moni-437
toring, i.e., the economy reverts to the baseline case where no information on the realization438
of ✏t+1 is available. The free-riding problem of investor-funded ratings is noted in Warwick439
Commission (2009).440
8. Regulation Through Disclosure441
Suppose the government can pay a cost to reduce the average malfeasance share by  ,
replacing eq. (15) with
mt = (m̄t    ) + ✏t+1. (38)
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To pay for this, we impose a lump sum tax on the old equivalent to the average cost of442
deposit insurance, ⌧Disc,t = ⌧̄DI = 2.93 or 12.7 percent of output.443
co,t+1 = At+1[1 + (1  ↵t)rf,t+1 + ↵tr̃b,t+1]  ⌧Disc,t. (39)
Figure 11 considers the impact of this expenditure assuming the government is able to444
reduce malfeasance by either   = 0.2 or   = 0.4 after spending ⌧Disc,t. Recall that m̄s is445
either m̄H = 0.50 or m̄L = 0.22. The comparison economy is that with deposit insurance.446
Disclosure raises non-stolen output, wages, capital formation and consumption. Increasing447
the share of honest bankers encourages households to enter the banking sector in much the448
same way as deposit insurance. However, deposit insurance does nothing to eliminate fraud.449
As expected, the economy does far better if government disclosure is high. Average results450
for both levels of disclosure are reported in tables 9 and 10. Figure 12 compares average451
output, non-stolen output and lifetime consumption in the regimes discussed. Deposit452
insurance boosts output, but not non-stolen output or consumption. Monitoring, even453
ignoring free riding, makes little di↵erence to the equilibrium. Low disclosure references a454
government-instigated reduction in the share of bad bankers of   = 0.2. This reduces non-455
stolen output and consumption considerably despite the high cost of regulation, assumed to456
be equal to the cost of deposit insurance. High disclosure, reducing the malfeasance share457
by   = 0.4, produces further gains.458
The downside to a modest reduction in malfeasance is that it encourages investment in459
banking while still permitting shocks to malfeasance to cause volatility. Volatility under460
limited disclosure is similar to that under deposit insurance. This is illustrated in fig. 13,461
which depicts the standard deviation of key variables compared to the baseline. Signifi-462
cant disclosure solves this problem. Table 11 reports compensating variations. They are463
calculated as the percentage change in consumption, in all states, needed to produce the464
same expected utility as in the baseline, measured by averaging realized lifetime utility over465
10,000 generations beginning after the economy has been operating for 20 periods.24 The466
24In making these calculations we consider the same sequence of shocks for each setting.
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table shows that, compared with the baseline, deposit insurance is 4.1 percent less e cient,467
monitoring is 1.2 percent more e cient, a low level of government disclosure is 23.3 percent468
more e cient, and a high level of government disclosure is 37.9 percent more e cient.469
9. Conclusion470
Banking crisis, throughout the ages, have been precipitated by the exposure of bad/malfeasant471
banks (bankers). This news leads the public to defund the banks, often precipitously, which472
is termed a liquidity crisis. Under this, our paper’s view, liquidity crises are the result of,473
not the cause of financial retrenchment with its attendant economic decline. The medium474
for financial malfeasance in all its manifestations is financial opacity. Leading up to 2008,475
opacity provided full cover for liar loans, no-doc loans, NINJA loans, Mado↵’s swindle,476
originate-to-distribute abuses, CDOs-squared and other highly complex tranched deriva-477
tives, unreported CDS positions, ratings shopping, failures (with government approval) to478
mark assets to market25 and the list goes on. The revelation of financial fraud amidst the479
financial fog produced the rush to liquidity that eventuated in the downfall of so many high480
profile banks. Had there been no malfeasance there likely would have been no crisis.481
If, as modeled here, the revelation of “good” bankers gone bad rather than of bad482
things happening to good banks is the source of financial crisis, dramatically expanding483
the government’s role in verification and disclosure of assets may be the answer. This484
prescription is the polar opposite of those who tout opacity as essential for maintaining485
liquidity of bank liabilities. The di↵erence in perspective arises in the case of counterfeit486
currency. If no one knows that some currency is counterfeit, both bad and good currency487
will be sources of liquidity. Disclosing the counterfeits can produce a run on, actually, a488
run away from the currency. Is society better o↵ suppressing news of the counterfeits and489
letting them continue to circulate? Doing so maintains liquidity, but permits ongoing theft490
and risks financial panic if news leaks out. The answer, in practice, is no. Counterfeiters491
are disclosed and prosecuted as a public service.492
No one would expect private citizens to actively investigate counterfeiters. But when it493
25See Andolfatto and Martin (2013)
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comes to banking, many have faulted investors, the vast majority of whom are quite small,494
for failing to keep track of their banks’ behavior. Indeed, the central premise of Dodd-Frank495
– that public funds will no longer be used to bail out private banks – appears predicated on496
the assumption that investors, knowing they are at risk, will better monitor their financial497
institutions. This flies in the face of the free riding problem. Just as government is needed498
to monitor, uncover, and disclose counterfeiting, our model suggests that government is499
needed to verify and disclose, in real time, all bank assets and liabilities.500
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A. Deriving Sectoral Returns592









and capital allocation is
Kb,t+1 =↵s,tAt+1,
Kf,t+1 =(1  ↵s,t)At+1.
Both the malfeasance share at t+ 1 and optimal allocation to banking, ↵s,t, depend on the
malfeasance share at t, denoted by subscript s 2 {L,H}. Let superscript S 2 {L,H} denote
the realization at t+ 1 of the mean malfeasance share, m̄s 2 {m̄L, m̄H}. After substituting
for capital, returns in each sector conditional on the state realized at t+ 1 are
r
S



























where we define the average productivity in the two sectors conditional on the realization593
of state S at t+1 as594
Z
S






























[(1  m̄S   ✏t+1)Zb]
1
✓ . (46)
These returns depend on the malfeasance share - both its mean state m̄S and ✏t+1 - and on595
the aggregate allocation to banking, ↵s,t.596
B. Solving for Allocation Decision with Private Monitoring.597
The following steps were used to solve for allocation decisions with private monitoring.598
1. Informed individuals begin by guessing the uninformed optimal allocation, ↵U,s,t.599
2. Use eqs. (30) and (31) to calculate optimal informed allocation, ↵I,s,t, for any realiza-600
tion of ✏t+1 in the support [a, b]. That is, we construct ↵I,s,t(✏t+1).601
3. Use this function to compute aggregate allocation ↵̄s,t(✏t+1), given by eq. (30).602
4. The first order condition, eq. (32), gives optimal uninformed allocation, ↵U,s,t.603
5. Iterate until the initial guess for optimal uninformed allocation matches the solution,604
yielding ↵U,s,t and ↵I,s,t(✏t+1).605
Repeating steps 1-5 over a range of values for nt, and substituting into eq. (33) allows us to606




  Time preference 0.5
✓ Capital share 0.3
Zf Farm productivity 10
Zb Bank productivity 16
m̄H Mean malfeasance share in high malfeasance state 0.50
m̄L Mean malfeasance share in low malfeasance state 0.22
qH Probability of high malfeasance at t+ 1, given high malfeasance at t 0.6
qL Probability of high malfeasance at t+ 1, given low malfeasance at t 0.4
a Maximum reduction in malfeasance -0.1
b Maximum increase in malfeasance 0.1
Table 1: Parameter Values
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Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 23.12 4.25 16.46 29.86
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 12.38 25.95
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 4.33 9.08
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 8.85 16.51
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 0.72 4.01
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 0.94 3.52
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.57 0.29 0.28 0.87
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 1.20 7.93
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.84 4.60
Savings A 6.33 1.12 4.33 9.08
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 0.08 0.95
Wages w 12.66 2.23 8.67 18.16
Table 2: Average Values in Model’s Stochastic Steady State
33
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 24.90 3.81 18.64 29.86
Non-Stolen Output 20.62 2.48 16.17 25.95
Consumption when Young Cy 7.22 0.87 5.66 9.08
Consumption when Old Co 12.74 1.79 9.24 16.51
Annualized Bank Returns 2.68 0.51 1.88 4.01
Annualized Farm Returns 1.53 0.34 0.94 2.3
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.86 0.01 0.85 0.87
Bank Capital Kb 4.41 2.39 1.21 7.85
Farm Capital Kf 2.14 1.44 0.84 4.60
Savings A 6.55 1.12 4.39 8.99
Bank Labor Lb 0.74 0.24 0.34 0.95
Wages w 14.44 1.74 11.32 18.16
Table 3: Average Values when Mean Malfeasance Share is Low at t
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Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Output Y 21.33 3.92 16.46 28.79
Non-Stolen Output 15.52 1.04 12.38 18.33
Consumption when Young Cy 5.43 0.37 4.33 6.41
Consumption when Old Co 10.76 1.08 8.85 14.00
Annualized Bank Returns 1.40 0.34 0.72 2.14
Annualized Farm Returns 2.48 0.30 1.84 3.52
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.28
Bank Capital Kb 3.34 2.34 1.20 7.93
Farm Capital Kf 2.76 1.44 0.85 4.58
Savings A 6.10 1.06 4.33 9.08
Bank Labor Lb 0.38 0.28 0.08 0.85
Wages w 10.87 0.73 8.67 12.83
Table 4: Average Values when Mean Malfeasance Share is High at t
35
Figure 1: Annualized Returns at t+ 1 Conditional on the Shocks to the Mean Malfeasance Share at t+ 1
36
Figure 2: Histograms of Realized Returns conditional on Mean Malfeasance State, m̄s
37
Figure 3: Histograms of Assets, Non-Stolen Output and Returns to Banking and Farming
38
Figure 4: The Economy’s Transition – High to Low to High Mean Malfeasance
39
Figure 5: The Economy’s Transition – Low to High to Low Mean Malfeasance
40
Figure 6: Transition to High Mean Malfeasance after Extended Low Mean Malfeasance
41
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
✏  0.078  0.050 0.093 0.026 0.063 0.013 0.027 0.062 0.085 0.083
Table 5: Path of ✏t for First Ten Periods of Transition
42
Figure 7: Baseline Transition
43
Figure 8: Economy’s Transition With and Without Deposit Insurance.
44
Baseline Insurance % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 27.44 2.26 +19  47
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 17.71 4.75  2 +49
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 6.20 1.66  2 +49
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 11.51 2.66  2 +49
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.94 0.39 +44  50
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - -  100  100
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75  100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 6.19 1.66 +60  31
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00  100  100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 6.19 1.66  2 +49
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77  100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 12.40 3.32  2 +49












↵H,t   0.28  
↵L,t 0.45 1.00 1.00
Table 7: E↵ect of Information on Allocation to Banking.
46
Figure 9: An Example Transition With and Without Monitoring
47
Baseline Monitoring % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 23.16 4.56 0 +7
Unstolen Output 18.08 3.19 18.31 3.24 +1 +2
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 6.41 1.13 +1 +2
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 11.9 1.83 +1 +3
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.01 0.78  2 +1
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 1.96 0.53  2  7
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.57 0.29 0.57 0.32 0 +10
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 3.93 2.63 +1 +9
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 2.48 1.77 +1 +20
Savings A 6.33 1.12 6.41 1.14 1 +2
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 0.56 0.35  1 +10
Wages w 12.66 2.23 12.82 2.27 +1 +2
Table 8: Average Values with Monitoring
48
Figure 10: The E↵ect of Free Reports on Monitoring Expenditure
49
Figure 11: Economies with Low and High Disclosure and Deposit Insurance.
50
Baseline Low Disclosure % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 30.94 1.92 +34  55
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 26.14 5.33 +45 +67
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 9.15 1.87 +45 +67
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 14.06 2.99 +20 +68
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.11 0.33 +3  57
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - -  100  100
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75  100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 9.14 1.87 +136  23
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00  100  100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 9.14 1.87 +44 +67
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77  100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 18.30 3.73 +45 +67
Table 9: Average Values with Low levels of Disclosure,   = 0.2
51
Baseline High Disclosure % Change
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Output Y 23.12 4.25 32.75 0.88 +42  79
Non-Stolen Output 18.08 3.19 31.20 2.79 +73  12
Consumption when Young Cy 6.33 1.11 10.92 0.98 +73  12
Consumption when Old Co 11.75 1.78 17.35 1.54 +48  14
Annualized Bank Returns 2.04 0.77 2.09 0.15 +2  81
Annualized Farm Returns 2.01 0.58 - -  100  100
Allocation to Banking ↵ 0.57 0.29 1.00 0.00 +75  100
Bank Capital Kb 3.88 2.42 10.92 0.98 +181  60
Farm Capital Kf 2.45 1.47 0.00 0.00  100  100
Savings A 6.33 1.12 10.92 0.98 +73  12
Bank Labor Lb 0.56 0.32 1.00 0.00 +77  100
Wages w 12.66 2.23 21.84 1.96 +73  12
Table 10: Average values with High Levels of Disclosure,   = 0.4
52
Figure 12: Comparing Means of Aggregates in Di↵erent Regimes.
53
Figure 13: Comparing Variability of Aggregates in Di↵erent Regimes.
54
Regime Percentage Compensating Di↵erential
Deposit insurance -4.1%
Monitoring 1.2%
Low disclosure,   = 0.2 23.3%
High disclosure,   = 0.4 37.9%
Table 11: Percentage Compensating Variations
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